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Like■many other questions constantly coming up for
determination in our courts, the question of the responsibilities 
of innkeepers and the corresponding responsibilities of sleeping
car companies, has two sides- both ably supported by judicial argu­
ment. The purpose of this paper is to arrange in logical order 
the decisions and arguments on each side of the question. That it 
is important there can be no question, as the constant increase of
travel both for pleasure and business is phenomenal, and the per-
»!
fection of means of transportation is more and more advanced, and 
with each step forward the sleeping car approaches the perfection 
of accomodations offered by an inn. And when these two meet it wil 
be necessary for the courts to change the law of innkeepers to 
conform with that of the companies operating sleeping cars, or 
vice versa.
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The perfection of now inventions, the extension of a 
nation’s territory, and the new conditions resulting therefrom, 
all have subtle influences upon the law. Especially has this been 
true during the last few centuries. All of those things which we 
now consider essential to our happiness, nay, even our existence * 
have all sprung up within that time. The development of the 
application of steam; the discovery of the hidden forces of elec­
tricity; the conquest of new territory; the moderations and changes 
in forms of government; and the aplication of all of these things 
and many more, has made the life of the ninteenth century entirely 
different from that of the sixteenth.
Formerly each one led a more independent life, and did not 
depend so absolutely upon his fellow citizens. Today the banker or 
manufacturer of the east is dependent upon the southern planter 
for much of his raw material and means of investment; the southerner
looks to the fruit raiser of the Pacific slope for many of his 
delicacies; the fruit raiser of California looks to the farmer of 
the middle west for his stock and his grain; and again, the farmer
looks to the east for many if i ot most of his manufactured arti-
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cles. Thus the great and endless chain of commerce is welded 
link by link, and each part is dependent upo the other for 
support.
The needs of one section are flashed to a source of supply 
in a moment by means of the telegraph. Tho goods are transported
in the number of days that it formerly took months, and the .parties 
are brought into personal contact in a few days or hours. The 
more two persons have to do with one another the more imperious 
it is for them to be bound by the same conditions, subjected- to 
the same laws, and dependant upon the same sources of information. 
There is far more need of a well defined code of international 
law between England and the United States than there is between
the latter and the natives of Borneo. One would be active and
’•
the other latent.
The modern branch of contracts known as the law of Bailments, 
was recognized and stood separated in the Civil Law of Rome at the 
time of Justinian; but its introduction into the Common Law of 
England if of a comparatively recent date. Tho history of the 
modern English Law of Bailments may be said to commence with the 
case of Coggs v. Bernard, decided by the English Court of Queen’s
Bench in the second year of Queen Anne, and which summed up the 
law as previously laid down in scattering cases and arranged it
in logical order. Although the subject was slightly touched upon 
now and then .in some of the earlier reports, the word itself, as a 
title of the law, is rarely found in use earlier than the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, rn the case cited it was conclusively 
laid down that the common carrier was the insurer of the goods of 
its patrons, a rule of law which, though early laid down, is 
atrictly adhered to in both England and America.
Withthe invention of steam and its application to railways, 
a broad field of jurisprudence was opened up. The earlier cases 
classified the railway among all other common carriers, and that 
branch of bailment law was found applicable to nearly all of the 
earlier cases arising under it. But the progress of the railways 
did not cease. That line that could offer the most inducements 
in the way of comforts and conveniences to the prospective.passen­
gers secured the traffic. When the railways became so extensive 
that a journey could not bo completed in a single day, and especial­
ly on our great transcontinental lines, where sometimes a week was 
consumed in a'single trip, the necessity for means of continuous 
traveling became imperative. Necessity accomplished its own 
results, and the beginning of the present continuous traveling
accomodations was the result.
.
The first crude, incomplete and uncomfortable forerunners of
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the present palace-like accomodations cannot be compared with the 
latter. Crude and incomplete as they were, they formed the nucleus 
from which the present perfections were constructed. The earlier 
cars furnished nothing, but a bed, incomplete and unprotected; 
the cars of today furnish staterooms as well as berths, and added 
to that are toilet accomodations, and on the foremost roads.of 
the country an unexcelled cuisine is also added to the inducements 
to a traveller, and today one can board a car in New York and 
never leave the same until it reaches San Francisco four or five 
days later. When these sleeping cars were added to trains the 
question arose whether the persons operating them were to be held 
responsible to the persons who intrusted themselves to their care, 
as innkeepers or as common carriers; or, if neither of these, 
to what responsibility such persons should be held. Cases on the 
the subject have come up in tho Courts of nearly all of the States 
and 01 U e tnaoed o > _ » U o C 3 ,and iu is l* .;.o p.irpose of wh.Ls paper to
enter into the discussion of the different classes of decisions 
and to see to which one of the leading classes of cases the 
soundest legal reasoning attaches.
In the old days a traveller practically took his life in his 
hand when he undertook a journey. The country was overrun with 
freebooters and robbers. No one’s person or property was safe 
unless guarded and protected by force of arme. It was mainly due
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to these conditions that the innkeeper was early held to strict 
responsibility for the property of his guest brought to his inn. 
The danger of the innkeepers being in league with robbers was 
the prime mover of the cause, and, though his responsibilities 
may seem rather preposterous for these advanced days of civili­
zation, it is perhaps well that such strict care was early re­
quired.
This responsibility has been a point of much discussion in 
the courts, and just what is due from the innkeeper to the guest 
whom he accomodates for hire can only be laid down in general 
principles.. At common law he is responsible for the acts of his
domestics, and for thefts, and is bound to exercise all due care
.
in taking care of the goods and baggage of a traveller who stops 
at his house as his guest, and deposits his baggage there, or . 
inorusts it to the. care of his family or servants, and is bound to 
guard it against loss or subtraction, day and night. (2) And he 
is so held responsible on the ground of his making profit for 
entertaining the guest. (3) The custody of the goods of his guest 
is part and parcel of the contract to feed, lodge, and accomodate 
the guest for a suitable reward. (4)
One of the earliest cases in which this responsibility is 
laid down is the early one known as Calye’s case (5). And in this
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case it was held, that, if a guest came to an inn, and directed 
that his horse be put to pasture, and the horse was stolen, the 
innkeeper was not responsible, in his character as an innkeeper, 
for the loss of the horse. But the court virtually laid down the 
rule, that if the owner had given no directions as to the disposal 
and care of the horse, and the innkeeper had voluntarily pastured 
the horse, he would have been responsible for its loss. .
Whether or not this rule would hold in all cases would depend 
entirely upon circumstances. Suppose for instance that it is 
the general custom in that part of the country to turn a guest’s 
horse upon pasture during.the summer season. Would it not be 
fairly presumed in such a case, that the owner’s consent would 
be presumed? If such is the custom, it seems to be in accord 
with the principles of law that it would. (6).
The same case goes further, and says that the innkeeper is 
bound to keep safe the goods of the guest deposited within the 
inn, even though he did not know that they were there; and that 
the innkeeper would be bound to pay for the goods if they were 
stolen, unless such theft was committed by a servant or companion 
of the guest. The responsibility of the innkeeper to his guest 
extends to all of his servants and domestics, and to all of the 
movable goods, chattels and moneys which the guest may have 
placed within the inn, infra hospitium; but it does not extend to
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trespasses committed upon the person of the guest, nor does it 
extend to loss occasioned by inevitable casualty, act of God, or 
by superior force, as robbery (7).
„ It is no excuse for the innkeeper that he was, at the time 
of the accident, suck or insane, for he was previously required 
to provide careful servants and for whose acts he is bound (8).
In Bennett v. Mellor (9), the innkeepers responsibility was 
laid down very strictly. In that case the plaintiff’s servant 
come to the inn to deposit certain goods for a time. The inn­
keeper refused to keep the goods, and the servant remained in
¥
the inn as a guest with the goods placed near him, and they were 
stolen. It was held that the innkeeper was liable for' the goods, 
as the servant was entitled to the protection of his goods while 
he continued in the inn as a guest, the court holding that it 
was not necessary for the goods to be in the special keeping of 
the inrkeeper to make him liable; if they were in the inn it is 
sufficient to charge him.
It is not oven necessary to prove negligence on the part of 
the innkeeper, for it is his boundon duty to provide honest ser­
vants (10); and, such being the case, he ought to answer civilly 
for their acts, even if they should rob the guests who sleep 
under his roof.
The innkeeper, the same as a common carrier, is the insurer
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of the goods and baggage of his guests, and this responsibility 
as an insurer can be limited only by express agreement or notice 
(11). Even though this rule may seem severe, and it undoubtedly 
is in some individual cases, it is, as Sir William Jones observes, 
“founded on the principle of public utility, to which all private 
considerations ought to yield”. Travellers, who must be numerous
m  a rich and commercial country, are obliged to rely for their
.
accomodations entirely upon the good faith of innkeepers; and 
it would be practically impossible for them to prove the fraud or 
negligence on the part of the innkeeper in any particular case.
The Roman praetor held innkeepers responsible for the goods of
.their guests on the same general principle. Ulpian, when comment­
ing upon this edict, said that it was necessary to confide in the 
honesty of such men, for, if they were not held very strictly to 
their duty, they might yield to the temptation to commit a breach
of trust. They were bound to answer for all losses and damages
■ .
happening, even without their default, unless they were fatal 
losses and occurred from vis major or irrestible force (12).
In turning from the English reports to those of our own 
country, we find that the innkeepers of the United States are as 
fully responsible as those under the English law (13). In the 
case of Quintal v. Courtney (14), the innkeeper was held liable for
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money stolon out of the saddle Dags of the guest, which he had 
delivered to the servant without informing him or the innkeeper 
of their contents. And in Clute v. Wiggins (15), the innkeeper was 
held responsible for the theft of gags of grain in a loaded sleigh 
of a guest which had been placed for the night in a wagon shed or 
out-house appurtenant to the inn, with fastened doors. In that
case the sleigh was considered infra hospitium, and tho innkeeper 
liable,- even though no negligence was proved against him.
When we find that the liability of an innkeeper is so exhaust­
ive and plays such an important part in our law, it is important 
that we know to whom the description applies, and what is included 
under the term inns.
Going back to Calye’s case, we there find inns defined to 
be houses of public entertainment instituted for passengers and 
wayfaring men. The case goes nn to say that a neighbor, who was
not a traveller, and lodged at the inn as a friend, at the request
of the innkeeper, was not a guest whose goods would be under 
special protection. A house merely for lodging strangers for a 
season, who came to a watering place, and furnishing hay and stable 
room for their horses, and selling beer to them and no one else, was 
held not to be a public inn (16). It must be a house kept open 
publicly for the lodging and entertainment of travellers generally,
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for a reasonable compensation. If a person lets lodging only, 
and this upon previous contract with every person who comes, and 
does not furnish entertainment for the public at large indiscrim­
inately, it is not a common inn (17). In the case of Thompson v. 
Laay (18), this question was fully discussed; and in that case it 
was held that a house of public entertainment in London, whore 
provisions and beds were furnished for travellers, any any others 
who were capable of paying compensation for the same, was a public 
inn. The owner was held responsible as an innkeeper, even though 
he kept no stables, and his house was not the stopping place for 
stage coaches and wagons from the country. And in this case the 
guest did not appear to have been a traveller, but to have pre­
viously resided in furnished lodgings in the city. A lodging 
house proper was held to be one whose owner made a contract with 
every person who came, but an inn is a house, the owner of which 
holds out that he will receive all travellers and sojourners who 
are willing to pay a price adequate to the sort of entertainment 
provided, and who come in a situation in which they are fit .to 
be received (19). But the keeper of a mere coffee house or 
private boarding house is not an innkeeper in the sense of the 
law (20). If a guest applies for a room in an inn, for a purpose 
of business distinct from his accomodations as a guest, the par­
ticular responsibility does not extend to goods stolen from that
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room (21). Though a landlord cannot exonerate himself by merely 
handing over a hey to his guest, yet, if the guest takes the hey, 
it will be a question of fact whether he tooh it animo custodiendi, 
so as to exempt the landlord.
In the United States, most of the states have defined and 
regulated inns and taverns by statute, and to the great benefit 
of such regulation of affairs, that there are many improvements 
in the law of the subject, especially in limiting and defining 
theit responsibilities, and the whole subject is laid down and 
classified in the various statutes.
There is no doubt but that the sleeping car company is a 
public agency. It holds itself out to the public as doing a cer­
tain thing for the accomodation of travellers, and as such public 
agency it is subjected to public regulation and control. It is 
bound to treat all persons, whose patronage it solicits, without 
discrimination; that is to say, it is bound to carry all persons 
who, under reasonable regulations, apply for its add@d comforts 
to the traveller (22). It is not contended that the sleeping car 
company undertakes the duty of transporting the traveller from 
place to place. That duty is assumed by the railroad company, and 
for any breach &f the contract for transportation, and any injury 
that the passenger may receive that is connectdd with the moving
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of the train, he must look to the railroad company for his damages. 
The sleeping car company is not responsible for the negligence 
or misconduct of the employes of the railroad company, who are 
charged with the duty of operating the train to which the sleeping 
car is attached (23). The sleeping car compayy is not bound to 
furnish accomodations. In Searles v. Mann Boudoir Gar Go. (24), 
the plaintiff demanded accomodations which were refused on the 
ground that the car was full, and, even though one passenger had 
a section containing two berths, it was held that the company was 
discharged. And it is but reasonable that the companies be 
allowed to make reasonable regulations as to the making up the 
berths and the time and order of so doing. It has been held that
v
a person cannot demand and require that his berth shall be made up 
at once, when the sleeping car company had adopted rules requiring 
that the orders of the guests should be filled in the order in 
which they were given (25). And, so far as the sleeping car 
company’s responsibility for the baggage of the guest is concerned, 
it has been held that the sleeping car company is not a common 
carrier, and id therefore not hold responsible to the insurance 
liability of the latter(26).
As the sleeping car company makes no contract of carriage, it 
is reasonable that they should not be held as carriers; but there
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is no doubt but that tho sleeping can company does enter into some 
hind of a contract with the person who purchases a ticket, and 
whether or not that contract is analagous to that of an innkeeper 
is the mooted question.
Prom the very construction of the cars the berths are not 
separate rooms, and therefore the guest is precluded from locking 
his door and thereby excluding all intruders; yet suppose that an 
innkeeper is forced, as the case often is, on account of cases 
frequently arising where he cannot accomodate each guest with 
a separate room, and places several guests, strangers to each 
other, in the same room; or oven quite a number in the hallways 
on improvised cots, as often has been the case; but in any such 
case it would not be contended that the innkeeper is not liable. 
The fact that his house is crowded and that he did not have a 
separate fcoom for each guest does not excuse him.
How let us imagine a sleeping car remaining stationary at 
one point for a long time, months or years, as a place for the 
antertainment of travelers, and patronized by them as such, then 
would the fact that it was in fact a car on wheels, though never 
used as such, .instead of a house, exempt it from the liabilities 
of an inn? If the fact that it is a car does so exempt it, then 
a car stationed beside an inn and dicing the same business would
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be exempt from the liability to which the innkeeper would be 
hold; it would seem that such distinction was entirely without 
reason, and in fact the law would not so discriminate betwwn the 
two cases. xhon carrying this analogy a step farther and suppos­
ing that the car is so stationed at a certain point and is in 
fact held responsible as an inn, then would this liability as an 
inn coaso because it is moved daily from point to point? Xf so, 
why?
The recent perfection in the arrangment of sleeping cars, 
has placed at the disposal of the traveller well appointed state 
rooms, and the occupants of these state rooms may lock the door 
the same as the guests of an inn may. Will this change in the 
arrangment make it necessary to change the application of the law?
The argument that thieves might engage one or more berths in 
a car, and at the first opportunity leave the car carrying what 
articles Ijhey might steal before leaving, would extend as well to 
the case of an inn. Thieves, in the garb of respectable people, 
may take rooms at an inn, and afterwards steal what they can, and 
escape. Yet no one would contend that the innkeeper would not be 
responsible for the property so stolon, and this, whether stolen
in the night or day time. This would seem more burdensome than 
the case of a sleeping car, as in the latter there are but two
doors of exit, while in the large inns there many.
It is said that an innkeeper has a lien upon the baggage of 
his guest for the amount of his bill, and that no such lien exists 
in favor of the sleeping car company. This question has not yet 
been presented to any court for the reason that the sleeping car 
companies transact all of their business by selling tickets for 
berths or sections, and demand payment in advance. Hotel keepers 
do this in many cases where any doubt exists as to the respons­
ibility of the traveller, and apparently from the rule laid down 
in all of the books the innkeeper has the right to demand such 
prepayment in all cases. Owing to the system of prepayment, 
there is no reason for any such lien being claimed, and, up to 
the present time, no such claim has been presented.
It is also argued that the sleeping car and inn differ in the
character of their guests; the inn being required to receive all
who apply, while the sleeping car company takes in only those
. +
who are entitled to travel first class in the train of which the 
sleeping car is a part. But every person, by paying the price of 
a first class ticket, may become entitled to purchase a ticket and 
ride in a sleeping car. It is merely a matter of additional ex­
pense. The same rule applies to inns. Thus, the rates at a first 
class inn are from three tofive dollars per day, at a second class 
about one half as much, and at a third class inn from one third to
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one half as much. It, would seem that it would be as much ground 
£f complaint that a traveller cannot stop at a first class inn for 
the same compensation as at a third class one.
In all of our large cities there are today inns for the sole 
accomodation of a particular class of travellers, as men or women. 
In that case the rule that they must take every nne who applies 
is abrogated, but it is not contended but that the innkeeper is 
in that case required to exercise the same degree of care as in 
any other.
It is also argued that the sleeping car company furnishes a 
bed only and that but for a specified time, in the modern devel­
opment of innkeeping it is not necessary, to constitute anion, that 
it should furnish meals and all the accomodations formerly re­
quired (27). Where meals are served on the sleeping car, as they 
generally are on the best of roaxls, it could scarcely be contended 
that it differed from an inn in its accomodations.
Tt is contended that the contract with the sleeping car com­
pany is for a fixed period. E'et us investigate the contract of 
the sleeping car company. When a ticket is purchased in Chicago 
entitling the passenger to the use of a berth in a sleeper from 
Chicago to say Seattle, the contract is not for the use of the 
sleeper for three days, but for the use of it from Gfhicago to 
Seattle. If a contingency should arise, as the trains being
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blockaded by snow and a week consumed In the trip, It cannot be 
contended that the sleeping car company would be entitled to 
extra compensation. In any case the distinction is more technical 
than real. If a traveller should inform the innkeeper when he 
registered as a guest that he would remain two days or any other 
fixed period of time, it could not thereby be contended that he 
became a lodger and the innkeeper merely held to the responsibili­
ties 01 a lodging house keeper. The guest would be there tempor­
arily until his business was completed, and the innkeeper would be 
liable to him for any dereliction of duty by himself or his em­
ployes. How, if a traveller has purchased a sleeping car berth 
and a first class ticket from Chicago to St. Louis, and enters the 
sleeping car, for the use of which he has paid in advance, will 
the fact that the contract is to continue until the car reaches 
St. Louis, some ten hours later, change the contract from that of 
an innkeeper (28) ?
In the case of Pullman’s Palace Car Company v. Lowe (29), 
this view of the liability of the sleeping car company is sustained 
and it was held liable for the baggage of its guests to the same 
extent as the innkeeper. Maxwell, j., in a learned and exhaustive 
opinion, handed down the opinion of the court, saying: “it may
be well to consider what the company undertakes to perform, and
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also what, It doen not undertake. The latter proposition will be 
considered first. Xt does not undertake to furnish a railway for 
its cars to move upon, nor the motive power to propel them, and 
hence is not entitled to compensation for the ordinary carriage of 
passengers. Tt does invite for hire all passengers holding first 
class tickets to occupy its cars. In effect, it says to all such 
passengers: “We will furnish you safe, pleasant and commodious cars, 
with all possible facilities to prevent weariness and fatigue, 
with comfortable sleeping•accomodations, if you will pay the price 
demanded in addition to the regular fare”. The nature of this 
undertaking is the question for consideration. On the one hand, it 
is claimed that, so far as the company holds itself out as perform­
ing the duties of an inn keeper, so far should it be charged with 
the SuriCo liabilities of the same. On the other hand it is sought 
to make the liability of the company merely that of a lodging house 
keeper. In the very able and carefully prepared briefs of the 
attorney for the plaintiff in error, we find the following objec­
tions to charging the company with the liability of an innkeeper.
H'e says: “It Undertakes; first, to furnish accomodations to first 
class passengers exclusively; second, to furnish toilet accomoda­
tions to such passengers; third, to furnish a certain specific 
seat or bed to each such passenger; fourth, to furnish a servant
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who will respond to all proper demands on his service by such 
passengers, promptly and politely; but to do these four things for 
a limited time, which is agreed upon by it and each passenger, in
advance. It does not make this agreement with all who travel by
rail. It makes this agreement with first class passengers ex- 
elusively”. The distinction between an innkeeper and a lodging 
house keeper is set forth in many cases, but it is very well drawn 
in the case of Cromwell v. Stephens (30). After quoting the defin­
ition of an inn as given by Oakley, C. j., in Wintermeete v.
Clark (31), co-wit; “Where all who come are received as guests, 
without any agreement as to the duration of their stay or as to the 
terms of their entertainment”; and from Willard v. Reinhardt (32),
in which the distinction between a boarding house and an inn was
declared to be this; “In a boarding house, the guest is under an 
express contract, at a certain rate, for a certain period of time, 
but in an inn, there is no express agreement; the guest, being on 
his way, is entertained from day to day, according to his business, 
upon an implied contract”; and from Carpenter v. Taylor (33) as 
follows; “ Mere eating houses cannot be considered as inns. They 
are wanting in some of the requirements necessary to constitute them 
inns”; it will be seen that a distinction is attempted to be drawn 
between the sleeping car company and the innkeeper because only a
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certain class can occupy such cars, viz., persons holding first 
class tickets; whereas, at an inn, all who conduct themselves 
properly may be entertained. There is a great confusion in the 
decisions as to what constitutes an inn. In Galye’s case (34) it 
was held that inns were instituted for travellers and wayfaring 
men. In another case, an inn is defined to be a house where the 
traveller is furnished all he has occasion for, while on the way 
(35). Bouvier defines an innkeeper to be ' the keeper of a common 
inn for the lodgment and entertainment of travellers and passen­
gers, their horses and attendants, for a reasonable compensation’. 
The innkeeper is bound to take in and receive all travellers and 
wayfaring persons, and entertain them, if he can accomodate them, 
and the same is true of a sleeping car company as to all pefsons 
holding first class tickets. The fact that all persons holding 
second or third class tickets agree in effect, in consideration of 
the lower fare, to waive their right to enter a sleeping car, does 
not enter into the case any more than that of a traveller who, to 
avoid the expense of an inn, should stop at a private house. In any 
event, the company which sells sleeping car tickets to all first 
class passengers that may pay the price, to that extent stands in 
the same relation as an innkeeper, who must, for hire, entertain 
those asking for entertainment. A more difficult question is to 
properly define the word guest at a hotel. Parsons defines a guest
- 2 1 -
~'to bs-v one who comes without any bargain for time, remains without 
one, and may go when he pleases’(36). This is not sufficiently 
comprehensive to be a proper definition. Xn Wallings v. Patter 
(37), the Supreme Court of Connecticut defines the word guest as 
follows: “A guest is one who patronizes an inn as such. But it
is said that none but a traveller can be a guest at an inn, in a
■
legal sense” . We do not suppose that the court intended, in the
definition above quoted, to lay stress upon the word‘traveller’.
It is used in its broad sense, to designate those who patronize
inns. In Wintermute v. Clark (38), the court say that, in order
to charge a party as an innkeeper, it is not necessary to prove
that it was O] ly for the reception of travellers that his house
wus kept open; it being sufficient to prove that all who came were*
'
received as guests, without previous agreement as to the time or 
terms of their stay. A public house of entertainment, for all who 
choose to visit it, is the definition of an inn. These definitions 
are really in harmony with other. Webster defines a traveller as 
“one who travels in any way”. Distance is not material. A townsman 
or neighbor may be a traveller,and therefore a guest at an inn, 
as well as those who come from a distance or foreign country. If 
he resides at the inn, his relation to the innkeeper is that of a 
boarder; but if he resides away from it, whether far or near, and
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comes to it for entertainment as a traveller, and receives it as 
such, paying the customary rates, we know of no reason why he
should not be subjected to all the duties of a guest, and entitled
■
■
tb all the privileges of one. In short, any one away from home,
receiving accomodations at an inn as a traveller, is a guest, and
.entitled to hold the innkeeper responsible as such. This, we 
think, is the correct definition of the word guest, and we adopt 
the same (39). In Dumbier v. Day (40) this court held that an
.
innkeeper was bound to take all possible care of the goods, money, 
etc., of his guests while in his house. And if the goods or 
money of a guest be stolen from the inn, through no fault or 
neglect of the guest, nor by a companion guest, and there is no 
evidence to show how it was done, or by whom, the innkeeper is 
liable for the loss. This, we think, is a correct statement of 
the law.
“ “A lodger is defined by Bouvier to be rohe who inhabits a por­
tion of a house of which another has the general possession and 
custody’. There is some confusion in the decisions, arising 
mainly from the want of a clear definition of what constitutea a 
'guest’ as distinguished from a mere ’lodger’. Generally, however, 
a lodger is one who, for the time being, has his home at his 
lodging place (41). The rule, under the decisions, is not of
“3*-------------------------------------------
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univorsal application, but nearly so (42).
“It will be seen that the engagement of the sleeping car 
company, as far as it goes, is exactly the same as the duties 
assumed by an innkeeper. A passenger, on entering a sleeping car 
as a guest, because that is what he is in fact, necessarily takes 
his ordinary wearing apparel with him, and some articles of 
convenience, comfort, or necessity. The articles, when placed
in the care of the company’s employes, are infra hosoitium. and 
are at the company’s risk. The liabilities of innkeepers are 
imposed from considerations of public policy, as a means of pro­
tecting travellers against the negligence and dishonest practices 
of the innkeeper and his servants. Occasionally, no doubt, the 
innkeeper is subjected to losses without anJJ fault on his part. 
This, however, is one of the burdens pertaining to the business,
and the courts have deemed it necessary to enforce this with 
wholesome vigor to secure the security of travellers. Besides, 
where the loss is sustained, neither party being in fault, it 
must be borne by one of them, and it is no more unjust to place 
it on the innkeeper than on the guest. The liabilities incident 
to the business are to be considered in fixing the charges for the 
service (43). Except in the matter of furnishing meals, there 
seems to be no essential difference between the accomodations at
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on inn and those on a sleeping car, except that the latter are 
necessarily on a smaller scale than an inn. In both cases the 
porter meets the traveller at the door, and takes whatever portable 
articles he may have with him. He waits upon him and the other 
passengers in the car so long as they may remain therein. The 
traveller is not required to sit in his seat during the day, but 
may, if he so desires, go forward into the other cars on the train, 
and at the stations go out on the platform. A passenger on a 
sleeping car need not avail himself of these privileges, but the 
fact that he may do so, and the fact that many persons actually do 
avail themselves of the some, is well known to every traveller, and 
to the company, and is a circumstance in the case. It is said that 
it would be unjust to hold the company to the some liability as an 
innkeeper, because thieves might take one or more berths in a car, 
and, at the first opportunity, leave the car, carrying what arti­
cles they could steal before leaving. The same is true of on 
innkeeper. Thieves in the garb of respectable people may take 
rooms at an inn, and afterwards steal what they can and escape, 
yet no one would contend that the innkeeper would not be responsi­
ble for the property so stolen in the night or in the day time; yet 
in many of the large inns of this country, at least, there are 
numerous doors of ingress, while on a sleeping car there but two.
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Were meals served on a sleeping car, no one would contend that It 
differed from an Inn in its accomodations. In this state meals 
are furnished on the through trains, and a passenger need not 
leave the car from the time of entering it until he reaches the 
end of the line. This, however, does not seem to have been the 
case on the railway in question. But the fact that meals are 
taken at designated stations on the line of the road, instead of on 
the train itself, does not change the character of the service 
rendered. So far as such services are rendered, they are the same 
in kind as those furnished by the innkeeper, and the security of 
travellers, and as the means of protecting them, not only against 
the negligence, but also against the dishonest practices of the 
agents or employes of the sleeping car company, requires that the 
company, so far as it renders service as an innkeeper, shall be 
subject to like liabilities and obligations”.
The legal reasoning in the above quoted opinion is certainly 
logical and equitable, but the precedent established in the aarlier 
cases is directly contrary to the ablve ruling. Even though the 
case stands alone it should not be treated lightly, as it is not 
too late for a reformation in the law, and the soundness of this 
view cannot be overestimated.
The leading case to the contrary, in which all of the reasons
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supporting that view aro reviewed, is the case of Blum v. Southern 
Pullman Palace Car Company (44), in which Brown, j., delivered the 
following exhaustive opinion: “A sleeping car company, which by
contract with a railroad company runs its cars in connection with 
the trains of the road, the latter company furnishing the motive 
power and the road, and making-the contracts with the passengers 
for their transportation, is liable neither as a common carrier nor 
an innkeeper for the baggage or personal effects of the passenger 
to whom it furnishes accomodations., and which he brings with him 
into ite car. The contract for the transportation of the pas­
senger being with the railroad company, and the compensation for 
the carriage being paid .‘to it, the passenger cannot be regarded 
as the passenger of the sleeping car company, nor can it be held 
liable as a common carrier for the carriage of his baggage for 
which it receives no compensation. It is not a carrier at all, but 
merely furnishes accomodations to the passengers of another company, 
nor can it be regarded as an innkeeper, who is defined to be “the 
keeper of a common inn for the lodging and entertainment of trav­
ellers and passengers, their horses and attendants, for a reasonable 
compensation, as a public business, and who is bound to take all 
travellers and wayfaring persons, and to entertain them; and who, 
in consequence of his public employment, is held to the most 
rigid responsibility for the goods of his guest”. This extraord-
-27-
inary liability of the innkeeper, standing less upon reason than 
upon custom, growing out of a state of society no longer existing, 
should not be extended, it has been said, to the proprietors of 
a sleeping car, for the following reasons:
“The peculiar construction of sleeping cars is such as to 
render it almost for the company, even with the most careful 
watch, to protect the occupants of the berths from being plundered 
by the occupants of adjoining sections. All the berths open upon 
a common aisle, and are secured only by a curtain, behind which a 
hand may be slipped from an adjoining or lower berth, with 
scarcely a possibility of detection.
“As a compensation' for his extraordinary liability, the inn­
keeper has a lien upon the goods of his guests for the price of 
their entertainment. I know of no instance where the proprietor 
of a sleeping car has ever assereted such a lien, and it is pre­
sumed that none such exists. The fact that he is paid in advance 
does not weaken the argument, as innkeepers are also entitled 
to prepayment.
“The innkeeper is obliged to receive every guest who applies 
for entertainment. The sleeping car proprietor receives only 
first class passengers traveling upon that particular road, and it 
has not yet been held that he is bound to receive those.
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“The innkeeper is bound to furnish food as well as lodging, 
and to receive and care for the goods of his guests, and, unless 
otherwise provided by statute, his liability is unrestrained in 
in amount. The sleeping car furnishes a bed only, and that too 
but for a single night. It furnishes no food, and receives no 
luggage, in the ordinary sense of the term. The conveniences of 
the toilet are but incident to the lodging.
“The conveniences of a public inn are an imperative necessity 
to the traveller, who must otherwise depend upon private hospital­
ity for his accomodations, notoriously an uncertain reliance.
The traveller by rail, however, is under no obligation to take a 
sleeping car. The railway offers him an ordinary coach and cares 
for his goods and effects in a van especially provided for that 
purpose.
“The innkeeper may exclude from his house every one but his 
own servants and guests. The sleeping car company is obliged to 
admit the employes of the train to collect fares and control its 
movements.
“The sleeping car company cannot even protect its guests, 
for the conductor of the train has a right to put them off for 
nonpayment of faro or violations of its rules and regulations .
In Pa liman’s Palace Car Company v. Smith (45), Sheldon, J.,
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delivered the opinion of the court, saying! “Kent,, in defining cm 
inn, says r ^ It must bo a house kept open publicly xor oho lodging 
and entertainment of travellers in general, for a reasonable com­
pensation. If a person lets lodging only, and upon a previous 
contract with every person who comes, and does not affford enter­
tainment for the public at large, indiscriminately, it is not a 
common inn’.
“A keeper of a mere coffee house, or private boarding or 
lodging house, is not an innkeeper in the sense of the law (46). 
It must be a common inn, an inn kept for travellers generally, 
and not merely for a short season of the year and for select 
persons who are lodgers (47). The duty of innkeepers extends 
chiefly to the. entertaining and harboring of travelers, finding 
them victuals and lodgings, and securing the goods and effects 
of their guests; and, therefore, if one who keeps a common inn, 
refuses either to receive a traveller as a guest into his house, 
or to find him victuals and lodging, upon him tendering him a 
reasonable price for the same, he is not only liable to render 
damages for the injury in an action on the case, at the suit of 
the party grieved, but also may be indicted and fined at Lhe suit 
of the King (48).
“The custody og the goods of his guest is part and parcel
"■ ■ - - ---- ------------ ----1 -........ =='1
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of the innkeeper’s contract to feed, lodge and accomodate the 
guest for a suitable regard (49).
“Prom the authorities already cited it is manifest that this 
Pullman’s Palace Car falls quite short of filling the character 
of a common inn, and the Pallman’s Palace Car Company that of an 
innkeeper.
“It does not, like the innkeeper,- undertake to accomodate 
the traveling public, indiscriminately, with lodging and enter­
tainment. It only undertakes to accomodate a certain class--those 
who have already paid their fare, and are provided with a first 
class ticket, entitling them to ride to a particular place.
“It does not undertake to furnish victuals and lodging, but 
lodging alone, as we understand. The appellant, as we understand, 
furnishes no accomodations whatever, save the Use of a berth and 
bed, and a place and conveniences for toilet purposes.
“The innkeeper is obliged to receive and care for all the 
goods and property of the traveller which he may choose to take 
with him upon his journey. The appellant does not receive pay 
for, nor undertake to care for, any property or goods whatever, 
and notoriously refuses to do so. The custody of the goods of 
the traveller is not, as in the case of an innkeeper, accessory to 
the principl contract to feed, lodge and accomodate the guest for
-31-
a suitable reward, because no such contract is made.
“But if it should be deemed that, on principle merely, this 
company should be required to take as much care of the goods of 
a lodger, as an innkeeper of those of a guest, the same may be 
said of the keeper of a boarding, house or of a lodging house”.
It would seem as though the arguments offered in the last 
two cases are logically answered and refuted in the case previously 
quoted. The fact remains, however, that the great majority of 
decisions throw the weight of authority upon the last ones given.
It now remains but to briefly recite the responsibilities of the 
sleeping car companies as laid down In the cases.
The amount of diligence required of a sleeping car company 
is best laid down in the case of Carpenter v. The New York, New 
Hampshire, and Hudson River Railroad Company (50). In that case 
it is heldthat a sleeping car company is bound to keep an employe 
in the car, charged with the duty of watching the interior of the 
same, continuously and constantly, while the passengers are 
asleep (51).
The court goes on to say that it is the intention of the par­
ties, when the traveller engages and pays for the berth, that the 
traveller shall have a place and opportunity to sleep. That it 
is a well known fact to the company that when the passenger goes
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to sleep he becomes powerless to protect his property from thieves, 
or his person from insult, and that the company is bound to use a 
degree of care commensurate with the danger to which the travellers 
are exposed, to protect them from such danger. And in considera­
tion xor the compensation received for such services, and the 
hazards to which the unguarded and sleeping passengers are exposed, 
it is not too onerous to hold the company responsible for such a 
degree of care.
In the case of Bevis v , The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com­
pany (52), it was held that the defendant was liable for the loss 
of articles stolen from the berth of the plaintiff while he slept, 
it being proven that the servants of the defendant did not remain 
in a position where they could have an unobstructed view of the 
car during the night, the court holding that it was the duty of 
the defendant to do all that was within its power tcb guard the 
car from robbery.
In the very important case of ITevin v. Pallman’s Palace Car 
Company (55), a very important rule of law as to the responsibil­
ities of sleeping car companies was laid down. In that case the 
plaintiff tendered to the car company the consideration demanded 
for the use of a berth on one of its cars, and the company refused 
to permit the plaintiff to use the same. The court held that the
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sleeping car company was a public agency, and as such subjected to 
public regulation and control; and when a traveller, entitled to 
the use of the car, demanded the same in a reasonable manner, at 
areasonable time and place, and tendered the price demanded for 
the same, the company was liable to the passenger in an action on 
the case for the refusal to sell him the ticket for a berth.
In Pullman’s Palace Gar Comapny v. Pollock (54), the car 
company was held liable for the loss of baggage by one of its 
guests, the court saying that while it was not a common carrier, 
strictly speaking, yet when it offered inducements for the traveller 
t±> accept its accomodations and received compensation for the same, 
it owed some duty to the traveller to protect his person from 
danger, and that the same duty extended to the baggage which the 
guest found it necesaary to take with him.
The total responsibilitite of the sleeping car company can
%
be summed up in a few words, and the authorities supporting the 
rules are cited in the notes. It is conclusive that the company 
must take reasonable care to protect the property of the passenger, 
especially while he sleeps (55). The company must, it seems, keep 
watch during the night and to prevent any unauthorized person from
entering the car,* and to use reasonable care to prevent thefts by 
the occupants (56). This duty is not, however, restricted to the
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period when the passenger is sleeping, but it extends to keeping, 
a reasonable watch over such of his necessary baggage and belong­
ings as he cannot conveniently take with him, nor watch himself, 
while he is absent from his berth preparing his toilet, or for 
other necessary purposes (57); or where he may leave the car for a 
time, leaving his baggage behind (58). For example, where money 
was stolen from the passenger's berth while he was asleep; ^hen the 
only employe kept on the car while it ran from Hew York to Boston, 
making eight stops on the way, was a man who acted as conductor, 
porter, and bootblack (59).
The word baggage, as used here, includes clothing and personal 
ornaments, and articles for personal use, and a reasonable sum of 
money to be used for travelling expenses (60), but not money in 
the keeping of the passenger to an amount beyond what would be 
required for travelling expenses (61).
The duty of the sleeping car company to protect the passenger 
from thieves, cannot be gotten rid of by words printed on the 
passenger’s ticket, or notices posted in the car (62).
The sleeping car company is liable for such articles in the 
custody of the passenger as fall within the denomination of 
’baggage’ and which there is a duty upon'it to protect, even when 
they are abstracted or stolen by its servants (63), and in such
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an -action the contributory negligence of the passenger would be 
no defense (54). But as to articles not baggage, the passenger 
having no right to their free transportation, there is no duty 
on the carrier to protect it, and if such property should be stolen 
by its servants, the sleeping car compahy would not be responsible, 
for, “a master is not liable for the torts or crimes his servant 
commits, not within the scope of his employment,- but to effect 
some purpose of his own, unless such tort or crime is of itself 
a violation of some duty which the master has assumed toward the 
person injured, and which he has undertaken to perform through 
trfe servant” (65).
And the sleeping car company is bound to protect the persons 
of its guests against the negligence or willful misconduct of 
its employees, whom it places in charge of ijjs cars (66).
